International organisations and terrorism. Multilateral antiterrorism efforts, 1960-1990 by Blumenau, Bernhard & Müller, Johannes-Alexander
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ftpv20
Terrorism and Political Violence
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftpv20
International Organisations and Terrorism.
Multilateral Antiterrorism Efforts, 1960–1990
Bernhard Blumenau & Johannes-Alexander Müller
To cite this article: Bernhard Blumenau & Johannes-Alexander Müller (2021): International
Organisations and Terrorism. Multilateral Antiterrorism Efforts, 1960–1990, Terrorism and Political
Violence, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2021.1938002
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2021.1938002
© 2021 The Author(s). Published with
license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
Published online: 26 Jul 2021.
Submit your article to this journal 
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
International Organisations and Terrorism. Multilateral 
Antiterrorism Efforts, 1960–1990
Bernhard Blumenau a and Johannes-Alexander Müller b
aCentre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV), University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK; bPolicy 
Department, OceanCare, Wädenswil, Switzerland
ABSTRACT
This article examines early antiterrorism negotiations within international 
organisations (IOs) and their outcomes. It assesses how international coop-
eration emerged in specialised, regional, and global IOs and provides a long- 
term overview from the 1960s until the late 1980s. Drawing on primary 
sources and scholarly literature, this article identifies the patterns, trends, 
and key characteristics of the successfully adopted measures. It demon-
strates that early multilateral antiterrorism efforts faced several obstacles 
(sovereignty, national interests, mistrust, and geopolitics), and, therefore, 
international negotiations fared better when following a piecemeal 
approach within specialised or regional organisations, where the focus 
could be on specific aspects of terrorism (e.g., hostage-takings). A key char-
acteristic of the successfully adopted antiterrorism instruments was the aut 
dedere aut iudicare principle, which allowed states to maintain perceptions of 
sovereignty by either extraditing or trying a suspect. The antiterrorism efforts 
examined here were mostly preventative in design and worked to discou-
rage future terrorists by ensuring that safe havens were closed and that 
perpetrators faced justice. The shift to suicide terrorism in the 1990s would 
instead require new international antiterrorism efforts to focus on pre- 
emptive strategies, depriving terrorists of the means to carry out attacks. 







Terrorism has long been a concern for the international community. When terrorists cross borders to 
plan or commit their acts—as happened for instance during the attacks in Paris in November 2015— 
states have to find ways to deal with these challenges that transcend their own territory and immediate 
control. This raises questions of cooperation and collaboration but also touches on national interests, 
mistrust, rivalry, and sovereignty. Devising international antiterrorism efforts is often a cumbersome 
and lengthy process that sometimes does not lead to any tangible results. The United Nations (UN), 
for instance, has been trying to develop a comprehensive convention against terrorism since the early 
1970s, but even in 2021 this goal remains elusive. Today, just as much as in the 1970s, concerted 
international action to counter terrorism remains a challenging endeavour, but some results have been 
achieved.
This article will offer an historical assessment of early international antiterrorism measures across the 
globe. The time span will cover the most proliferate and formative period in early international antiterror-
ism efforts, the mid-1960s to the late 1980s. With the escalation of international terrorism in the late 1960s, 
this issue started to emerge on the agendas of international organisations (IOs) and the first antiterrorism 
efforts were designed (for instance, at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)). This provides 
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a neat starting point for this study.1 As terrorism is political in nature, so are the responses to it. These 
efforts are overshadowed by geopolitics and the end of the Cold War will provide a suitable end point for 
this article, as this watershed moment meant that powers and power dynamics shifted significantly within 
the international arena and within IOs. Moreover, in the 1990s, there was also a noticeable transition in the 
nature of terrorism itself, away from—to borrow David Rapoport’s periodisation—the New Left or social- 
revolutionary period of the Red Brigades and Red Army Faction towards the Religious wave, as symbolised 
by Al Qaeda and the proliferation of suicide terrorism. These developments, this article will argue, also 
meant a change in the nature of antiterrorism efforts, away from a punitive/preventative approach towards 
a pre-emptive one, making the early 1990s a suitable end point for this study.
This article has a twofold mission. First, it provides an overview of the attempts of IOs (loosely 
understood) to counter terrorism. The IOs and their efforts will be grouped into three categories: 
specialised, regional, and global organisations. This categorisation will also provide some more 
conceptual clarity on what type of organisation could provide specific results rather than stalemates 
or mere declarations of intention.
Second, this article will explore the outcomes of international antiterrorism negotiations. It will 
discuss the problems that were encountered while conducting these negotiations as well as the 
compromises that were reached to overcome any challenges. The aut dedere aut iudicare (ADAI) 
principle—the obligation either to extradite or to try an alleged offender—is of the essence here to 
explain how compromises were reached when national positions clashed. Exploring what mea-
sures were developed in these three decades of dedicated international antiterrorism efforts, as 
well as assessing them, will be the empirical and analytical leitmotif of this text. However, this 
article deliberately does not discuss the “successes” or efficiency (or not) of the results of 
negotiations. As scholars of antiterrorism efforts know well, it is difficult to assess successful 
outcomes of policies with the limited amount of information available. This is certainly true for 
international efforts. While it might be possible to scrutinise a plethora of national archives and 
primary sources deriving from terrorists (as to their motivations, plans, and actions) to determine 
the impact of international antiterrorism efforts on acts of terrorism, this would be beyond the 
scope of an article. But this study could perhaps serve as a point of departure for such an 
endeavour in the future. Consequently though, this article is more concerned with the successful 
conclusion of negotiations, meaning that organisations and states agreed on a legal text (a 
convention, for instance) or on a public statement implying determination and further action, 
just as much as follow-up cooperation and collaboration as such.
Two vital terms need to be defined. In international politics, just as in scholarship, there is no 
consensus or standard definition of “terrorism.” There certainly was none in the period under 
consideration here. Various political actors defined it in ways most beneficial to their own interests 
(a concept best captured by the infamous phrase of “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom 
fighter”) and IOs themselves, even today, often struggle with defining “terrorism”; sometimes they 
define the phenomenon without really defining it at all.2 This politicisation of the term makes any 
political definitions advanced in that period suboptimal as defining parameters for this study; 
especially so as this article will show just how politicised the term actually was in the era under 
consideration. As for scholarship, a large corpus of literature exists on the definitional debate, yet no 
standard definition has yet emerged. The working definition used in this article is synthesised from 
various definitions used in the literature.3 Therefore, for the purpose of this article, “terrorism” will be 
understood to consist of acts or threats of violence committed by non-state actors for political motives 
in order to communicate political demands not just to the victims of the attacks but to a broader 
audience including national governments. To qualify as “international terrorism” these acts had to 
concern at least two states, either by the nature of the attacks, the demands made, or the actors 
involved. Certainly, state terror, due to the enormous resources available to states, has affected more 
victims and caused more harm than all acts of non-state terrorism combined across history. Yet 
because of the completely different power dynamics at play in state terror, including it in this piece 
would go beyond the remits of a single article, important as it is.
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“International organisations” is another key term to define. While various definitions exist,4 
defining IOs remains a thorny endeavour because of the multitude of entities that populate the 
international arena. As the focus here is empirical rather than conceptual, this article will assume 
a loose understanding of the term as a working definition: it will look at IOs as frameworks where 
several states come together somewhat regularly (rather than for bilateral visits), either in a loose 
setting (such as the Group of 7 (G7), which was understood to be something other than just multi-
lateral ad hoc consultations) or a more institutionalized one (for instance with a charter, a permanent 
secretariat and staff, a seat, dedicated buildings, and an assembly) to address specific issues (e.g., 
security, economics, environment, aviation, security politics, or a regional agenda). The emphasis here 
lies on governmental IOs—so the coming together of states. While it would have been interesting to 
look at the impact of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) or non-state actors 
(pressure groups for instance) on antiterrorism efforts, this would be beyond the remit of a single 
article albeit an issue that is still in need of better research. This definitional approach allows for a more 
holistic picture of antiterrorism efforts negotiated within international fora and thus extends to 
standard IOs, such as the ICAO, just as much as to non-institutionalised ones such as the G7 or the 
Club de Berne. It is the particular intention of this study to look not just at the “big” and well-studied 
IOs, such as the UN or European efforts. To provide a diverse, holistic, and global overview, smaller 
and understudied non-European IOs were deliberately included. This inclusive approach is a key 
feature of this article and underscores the extent to which terrorism has affected various kinds of 
international cooperation in different settings and parts of the globe in the three decades before the 
end of the Cold War. The one obvious exclusion is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
This study is concerned with non-military responses to terrorism and for this reason, NATO was not 
included.
The space restrictions of this article do not allow for a detailed assessment of every effort or IO. 
And this is not its purpose. Rather, the long-term genesis of the involvement of the international 
community in antiterrorism efforts, its patterns and trends that transcend individual institutions, 
will be exposed here. Such a long-term assessment makes lasting challenges visible and conse-
quently also offers some insights into the limits of global antiterrorism cooperation. In a nutshell, 
this article is concerned with the bigger picture rather than an exhaustive study of every organisa-
tion’s efforts.
Drawing on secondary literature, extensive archival research (especially in West German archives 
as the country was a keen observer of such efforts), and primary documents from national govern-
ments and IOs, this article will address a gaping lacuna in historical scholarship on IOs by offering 
a novel, empirically informed overview of how the international community responded to terrorism in 
the last three decades of the Cold War. The article will also tackle the lack of clarity on the role and 
benefits of various types of IOs and it will shed some light on less well-known organisations. In 
studying this important period in IO antiterrorism efforts, this article not only accomplishes the major 
goal of providing an historical account, but it can also serve as the basis for further empirical, 
conceptual, and theoretical work.
Specialised organisations
After the end of World War II (WWII), a new international system emerged as the League of Nations 
(LON) gave way to the UN and the old Eurocentric world order was replaced with a bipolar 
international system. Yet in this world of change, terrorism remained a constant. Initially, however, 
it was a local or regional concern. Most terrorism acts during the first two decades after WWII, 
whether committed in Mandate Palestine, Algeria, or elsewhere, were only of immediate concern to 
the people living in the territories and the government controlling them, but not a primary topic for 
international affairs. This changed in the late 1960s when international air traffic became a favourite 
target of terrorists.
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While skyjacking was not a new phenomenon,5 the goals behind it changed in 1968. With air traffic 
surging, Palestinian terrorists realised that by abducting planes they could get a significant number of 
hostages and attract global news coverage while not being trapped in one place. Since terrorism feeds 
off attention, this was a serious advantage. The number of hijackings rose hugely and while many of 
these crises were not terrorist in nature, the issue of skyjackings gained international attention.6
Therefore, after the El Al hijacking in 1968, UN Secretary General U Thant called on states to take 
decisive action against the “reprehensible act” of hijacking. The Council of Europe (CoE), the 
International Air Transport Association and the International Federation of Airline Pilots’ 
Associations supported him.7 All of these institutions saw the ICAO as the organisation with the 
primary responsibility for action.8 This was not surprising, as the ICAO was founded because the 
“abuse [of international civil aviation] can become a threat to the general security.” Consequently, the 
ICAO’s mandate was to ensure that “international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly 
manner.”9 The ICAO had, in fact, already been working on hijacking conventions. In 1963, it adopted 
the Tokyo Convention. Terrorist hijackings were not yet part of these negotiations, but they encom-
passed all offences on board aircraft, including hijacking. Importantly, the convention only applies to 
international flights and only to acts committed when the plane was “in flight,” i.e., between the 
moment “embarkation begins until the moment when disembarkation is completed.” Planes that were 
parked at an airport would not be covered.10
Another prominent issue was criminal jurisdiction.11 The Tokyo Convention marks the birth of 
one of the most important, if not the most essential, principle of international antiterrorism conven-
tions: the ADAI rule. This rule came to be an integral part of most subsequent international 
antiterrorism conventions. It stipulated that a person accused of a crime according to the convention 
would have to be extradited to a state wanting to try it (aut dedere) or, failing that, would have to be 
tried by the state denying extradition (aut iudicare). This clause was the result of extensive discussions. 
It was considered necessary to ensure that no offender could escape punishment, to prevent safe 
havens, and thereby to discourage further hijackings. Thus, while the principle was punitive in nature, 
it was preventive in design. However, the clause was watered down: the principle only referred to 
bilateral extradition treaties and did not create a duty to extradite in its own right (e.g., Article 16, 
paragraph 2).12 Yet, it still marks an important milestone in the evolution of international responses to 
terrorism though, because of the impact it would have on future treaties. While the negotiation of the 
convention was difficult, the real challenge laid in the ratification process, which did not produce 
a sufficient number of ratifications to allow the convention to enter into force until 1969.13
As was shown above, the 1968 El Al hijacking and its implication that skyjacking had become a tool 
for terrorists caused global concern.14 The Israeli response to the hijacking, a military attack on 
a Lebanese airport, further amplified worries about the international repercussions of terrorist acts. 
These reasons explain the above-mentioned calls for the ICAO to deal with hijackings as a matter of 
urgency.15 Another assault on an El Al plane, at the Zurich airport in February 1969, proved that what 
had happened in 1968 was not a one-off crisis. This event underscored the gravity of the threat and the 
UN Security Council subsequently put the incident on its agenda. During the debate, the U.S. 
representative found general approval when he suggested that the ICAO should deal with the matter 
rather than the Security Council. This was an attempt to deescalate international tensions, achieve 
timely results, and remove the debate on hijackings from the explosive Israel-Palestine context.16 This 
episode highlights two important observations on international efforts against terrorism. For one, it 
explains why specialised (or regional) organisations, with a more limited membership than the UN, 
were often preferred loci for developing practical measures. As they had a more restricted field of 
competency, these organisations could often remove the negotiations from the general, politicised 
debates on terrorism and focus on specific technical aspects of terrorism. This enabled them to develop 
limited but feasible instruments, rather than having to discuss the whole notion of terrorism—its 
politics and its causes—ad infinitum. Second, the statement underscores the desire by (Western) 
governments to disconnect the manifestations of terrorism—such as hijackings—from their (geo) 
political and underlying context, and especially to detach them from the Israel-Palestine conflict. 
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Western diplomats were well aware that if terrorism was directly connected to the Palestinians, Arab 
states would, by default, be reluctant to condemn it.17 These were the two leitmotifs that underpinned 
multilateral antiterrorism efforts, in many organisations, for at least a decade.
Against this backdrop, the ICAO heeded the calls to develop further instruments against hijackings: 
The Hague Convention (1970) and the Montreal Convention (1971) addressed some of the short-
comings of the 1963 Tokyo Convention. Indeed, while the latter was considered the first international 
step to address the issue of aviation terrorism, it did not provide a definition of the crime or clarity on 
extradition processes.18 The two subsequent conventions took a more stringent approach, for instance, 
by requiring states to impose severe penalties for hijacking and further tightening the ADAI obliga-
tion. They were also the first global (and not just regional) instruments to explicitly deal with an aspect 
of terrorism. The ICAO is hence the birthplace of modern (that is post-WWII) global antiterrorism 
efforts. Yet despite this success at adopting conventions, some governments (especially the US) were 
worried about the lack of an implementation mechanism to enforce them. Consequently, even before 
the Hague and Montreal Conventions were adopted, the U.S. was developing plans for a sanctions 
regime against states that harboured and protected hijackers. Amongst Washington’s allies, however, 
there was very limited enthusiasm for these plans as many states were concerned about the political 
ramifications, the impact on (the profitability of) their airlines and on bilateral air traffic treaties. These 
plans were thus shelved.19 It took ten years for them to resurface at a G7 summit in Bonn in 1978, as 
will be discussed later in this article.
These developments allow for two more noteworthy observations on these early ICAO efforts to be 
made: firstly, the leading role of Western states, especially of the US, in setting the agenda; and 
secondly, the general consensus amongst most states represented at the ICAO to avoid (non-state) 
interference with international aviation. While non-Western and Socialist countries disagreed on 
details and clauses of proposed drafts, all of them were in favour of general efforts that would prevent 
further hijackings. And despite different definitions of terrorism—an issue that was avoided as best as 
possible during the negotiations—states agreed in principle on the need to protect aviation.20 This 
pragmatic approach would also surface in other organisations, for instance at the UN during the 
negotiations of the Diplomats Convention as detailed further below.
Despite these international efforts, terrorist incidents in the air but also at airports21 continued into 
the 1980s. As a result, the ICAO adopted new standards and recommendation regarding unaccompa-
nied baggage as well as two resolutions on aviation security in 1986.22 The first one reiterated the firm 
condemnation “of all forms of unlawful interference wherever and by whomever perpetrated”23 and 
made it clear that violence, no matter how noble the cause, was never condoned. The second 
resolution, adopted in 1986, addressed the challenges posed by violence at airports, and was triggered 
by the Rome and Vienna airport attacks in 1985.24 These discussions resulted in the adoption of the 
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports in 1988. The protocol extended 
the Montreal Convention, with its ADAI clause, to acts committed at airports.
The piecemeal approach to international antiterrorism efforts continued to gain traction in other 
IOs as well. The hijacking of a cruise ship, the Achille Lauro in 1985,25 put pressure on the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) to act. Initially, the IMO responded by developing 
technical measures to strengthen port and onboard security, such as Circular 443 from 1986, which 
dealt with “Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers and Crew On Board Ships.” Two 
years later, the IMO went further and adopted the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation as well as the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf. Similar to previous conven-
tions (e.g., the Hague and Montreal Conventions and the UN Diplomats Conventions), the main 
purpose of this convention was to criminalize attacks against ships (Article 3) and to require states to 
establish jurisdiction over these acts (Article 6). But more importantly, the convention now also 
extended the ADAI principle to crimes committed against maritime vessels (Article 10). The Fixed 
Platforms Protocol dealt with the danger to offshore platforms, especially oil-drilling ones, in order to 
secure global oil supplies. Important from an analytical perspective here is that although there were 
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a few threats (e.g., against the Habitat Texaco Platform or Chevron Edith in 1983), none of these oil 
rigs were actually attacked and the motive behind these threats was non-political (i.e., to extort 
money).26 The protocol was thus negotiated with the intention of pre-empting a new genre of terrorist 
acts before they even occurred. This was against the trend, at the time, to develop anti-terrorist 
instruments in response to, rather than in anticipation of, specific events. The protocol (together with 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convention addressed below) was the odd one out in 
international antiterrorism efforts in the 1980s.
Much like the possibility of a terrorist attack on oil platforms—with all their tremendous economic 
and environmental repercussions—the threat of nuclear (or biological or chemical) terrorist acts (e.g., 
a dirty bomb) remained an alarming, yet thus far unprecedented, concern for the international 
community. The notion that nuclear terrorism could be a possible future scenario was understandable 
in light of the fact that terrorists were very good at exploiting new technologies (for instance 
airplanes).27 Moreover, the logic of terrorism—to spread fear and to shock—dictates that, ideally, 
every new terror attack would be worse than (or at least different from) the previous one. So, again, the 
notion that nuclear, biological or chemical material could be used in a future act was not completely 
outlandish. Therefore, in October 1977, IAEA members started drafting the Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which was adopted in 1980. Disagreement quickly arose 
over the exact scope of the convention: should it only apply to nuclear material in international 
transport or also include nuclear material while in national facilities.28 In essence, this was a question 
of national sovereignty and the extent to which countries were willing to allow foreign inspections, 
a deeply sensitive matter considering the national security implications involved. Eventually, the scope 
was limited to nuclear material while in international transport (Article 2). Far from being compre-
hensive and all-encompassing, the convention set minimum standards in respect to the transport, 
theft, and sabotage of nuclear material. In this regard, the convention is a continuation of the 
piecemeal approach, the trend of avoiding comprehensive conventions and instead focussing on 
distinct technical problems. Consequently, the convention criminalized the offence rather than 
mentioning “terrorism” (Article 7) and reiterated the ADAI obligation (Article 10).
As this section showed, sectoral organisations played a critical role in pioneering global anti- 
terrorism efforts. The piecemeal approach they developed was not a cure-all and states continued to 
disagree on the scope of efforts to be negotiated, or the very definition of terrorism. Nevertheless, the 
technical focus of the ICAO, the IMO, the IAEA, and others allowed countries to negotiate some 
antiterrorism instruments by focussing on the issues at hand, and thereby disconnecting them from 
the overarching (geo)politics of terrorism. The ADAI principle was of the essence here in order to 
achieve this goal.
Regional organisations
Another group of IOs also addressed terrorism: regional organisations. As hijackings became more 
frequent, the kidnapping or assassination of diplomats also proliferated. This occurred especially in 
Latin America, where (mostly Western) diplomats were abducted to exert pressure on their host 
governments to abide by certain demands. Most prominent on the list of victims were American 
officials, but Japanese, West German, British, and Swiss diplomats were also targeted along with non- 
Western and Soviet officials.29 And while the problem was not only restricted to Latin America 
(kidnappings also occurred in Spain, Canada, Uganda, Jordan, and Turkey), it remained the hotspot 
of this form of terrorism.
Therefore, and unsurprisingly, The Organization of American States (OAS) put the issue on its 
agenda and in 1970, its General Assembly issued a resolution that “condemn[s] strongly, as crimes 
against humanity, acts of terrorism and especially the kidnapping of persons and extortion in 
connection with that crime.”30 The resolution went on to “declare that these acts constitute serious 
common crimes,” called upon members to “adopt such measures as they may deem suitable [. . .] to 
prevent and when appropriate to punish crimes of this kind” as well as “to facilitate [. . .] the exchange 
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of information that will help in the prevention and punishment of crimes of this kind.”31 The Inter- 
American Juridical Committee was tasked with drafting a convention, and the text of it was sent back 
to the General Assembly in January 1971. It was adopted in February 1971 after a turbulent round of 
negotiations that saw six states32 walk out of the discussion in protest of, purportedly, too narrow 
a scope; and a further three states33 voted against it or abstained because of the convention allegedly 
violating their sovereignty. These deep rifts were reflected in the final convention text, which remained 
ambiguous.34
One of the most serious issues was that of political asylum, which had a long tradition in Latin 
America. It was enshrined in Article 6 of the convention: “[n]one of the provisions of this convention 
shall be interpreted so as to impair the right of asylum.” A further concession was made to sovereignty 
in Article 3, which postulated that “it is the exclusive responsibility of the state under whose 
jurisdiction or protection such persons are located to determine the nature of the acts and decide 
whether the standards of this convention are applicable.” But in order to still allow for the prosecution 
of kidnappers, the convention, much like the ICAO conventions, invoked the ADAI formula in Article 
5. The OAS Convention is thus a success story to some extent but also a lesson in how difficult it was to 
reach a loophole-proof agreement: on the one hand, the OAS members did negotiate and adopt, very 
rapidly, a convention that, in its preamble, would “strongly condemn acts of terrorism” and provided 
some mechanism for its prosecution. As such it was a signal of unity against terrorism—and the first 
time the phenomenon was called that in a convention title (Convention to Prevent and Punish the 
Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of 
International Significance); even though ultimately the convention dealt with the kidnapping of 
diplomats only. On the other hand, the dissent that so openly erupted during the negotiations and 
the loopholes it left for the punishment of the crime meant that, as one contemporary observed, “[i]n 
political terms, the attempt to create an effective, operating hemispheric alliance to counter diplomatic 
kidnappings was [. . .] a disaster.”35 The political differences, widespread distrust, and colliding 
national interests between states on a highly polarised, and often hostile, continent meant that no 
further success was possible. The convention, ultimately leaving prosecution of terrorism to the 
willingness of the signatories, was the only feasible common denominator.
Against this backdrop, it is reasonable to assume that more progress should have been possible 
between more like-minded states on a (section of a) continent that had had a positive history of 
integration and cooperation. Yet, Western European states, too, had their problems in developing an 
extensive legal regime against terrorism. There were two organisations that dealt with terrorism: the 
CoE and the European Communities (EC). The CoE had a clear mandate to harmonise law amongst 
European member states, and as such it is no surprise that it also addressed terrorism; but terrorism 
would not normally fall within the agenda of the EC (which was predominantly focussed on economic 
integration and prosperity at the time) and thus cooperation here occurred outside of the framework 
of the European treaties. Both organisations, however, turned their attention towards terrorism in the 
mid-1970s.
The CoE had already adopted a Convention on Extradition in 1957, but it made an important 
exemption for extraditing suspects accused of offences “regarded by the requested Party as a political 
offence or as an offence connected with a political offence.”36 This political offence exception (POE) 
continued to matter into the 1970s, when, for instance, the West German extradition requests to 
France for the terrorism suspects Abu Daoud, Klaus Croissant, or later Odfried Hepp, caused 
controversies.37 Yet, the increase in terrorist attacks in Europe together with the attention that was 
now paid to terrorism at the UN meant that the CoE, too, turned its attention back to the POE and 
tried to limit its impact on the prosecution of terrorism. The notion underpinning the efforts here, 
again, was that if a country refused to extradite a potential terrorist, its authorities had to at least try 
them in their own courts (ADAI) and thereby prevent terrorists from escaping justice.
A first effort in 1972 only led to meagre outcomes as it merely resulted in a Recommendation (no. 
684), which called for a survey of national measures and laws regarding terrorism. This under-
whelming result occurred because, at this stage, the Europeans thought the UN was the best place 
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to develop farther reaching measures.38 As the next section will show, these UN negotiations stalled in 
late 1972, and so the Europeans turned to their own institutions again in order to deal with terrorism. 
In January 1973, a committee was charged with examining the legal issues pertaining to international 
terrorism, especially those related to the POE. But the focus quickly shifted to the UN and its 
Diplomats Convention. Only once this convention was passed and other UN negotiations reached 
a stalemate did the CoE measures receive a new impetus from the Council of Ministers in 1974. 
A working group, consequently, started drafting a convention the following year. In early 1976, a text 
was produced and centred upon the principle of ADAI, with an emphasis on extradition. A list was 
also included in the convention (Articles 1 and 2), which itemised offences for which the POE would 
not apply. States were further obliged to make acts punishable under national law (Articles 6 and 7) 
and to grant one another judicial assistance (Article 8). While the POE was not completely abolished, 
its scope was further limited and although states could still refuse to extradite a suspected terrorist, 
they would now have to try them themselves and ensure that appropriate laws and penalties were in 
place. France, however, wanted the convention to go even further and vetoed it. A compromise 
was finally reached that withdrew the French veto and, in exchange, obliged EC members to negotiate 
another convention within the EC framework. The CoE Convention was adopted in November 1976 
and entered into force in August 1978. Reservations made by numerous members further provided 
some limitations to the expected end of the POE. Consequently, while the CoE ultimately managed to 
show a united front as well as its determination to tackle terrorism, and while the POE was cut back, it 
was not completely abolished. This principle, dating back to the 19th century, proved to have a long 
afterlife.39
In exchange for French acquiescence to the CoE Convention, the EC now turned to terrorism as 
well. In general, the EC followed a two-pronged approach: one focussed on practical and technical 
aspects of cooperation (the Trevi group) and another one aimed at negotiating a convention (the 
Dublin Agreement of 1979). Trevi had its roots in intragovernmental meetings that began in 1971 and 
were outside the framework of the EC institutions. Upon a proposal from the UK government, in 1976 
the EC members set up the Trevi group on different levels (ministerial and on the level of officials), 
which would normally meet twice a year. Trevi itself was subdivided into five working groups but only 
two of them—one on measures to combat terrorism (later on including safety of air travel), and one on 
technical, scientific knowledge and cooperation, and police training—met regularly. The basic role of 
Trevi was to exchange knowledge, experiences, and information on dealing with terror crises, to 
establish contact points, and cooperation in case of crises affecting more than one country. As far as 
these technical contacts were concerned, cooperation worked rather well. In 1979, the EC states also 
formed the Police Working Group on Terrorism bringing together special branches and counter-
terrorism units from the various member states on a regular basis.40 To flank this technical level of 
cooperation and to honour their promise to France in exchange for the adoption of the CoE 
Convention, in 1976, the EC members also set out to negotiate a legal framework for dealing with 
terrorism, and extraditions in particular.41 Much like Trevi, these negotiations took place outside of 
the mandate and framework of the European treaties and institutions.42
These discussions soon became cumbersome. Officially, the argument ran that the CoE Convention 
came with qualifications and reservations so the even more like-minded EC members should more 
easily, and more quickly, reach an agreement and implement a convention without loopholes. This 
turned out to be rather tricky, however, and antiterrorism fatigue quickly took its toll. Not least so 
because many members only engaged in these negotiations at all as a concession to France and not out 
of conviction in the usefulness of the enterprise.43 French efforts to broaden the mandate of the 
negotiations and to set up parallel negotiations for a common legal area further amplified this 
problem. Ultimately, the EC members adopted an agreement in Dublin in 1979. While the members 
also paid lip service to the French desire to continue negotiation for the common legal area, this was 
something that really only materialised with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. However, despite the 
efforts that went into it, the Dublin Agreement never entered into force as by the late 1980s all EC 
members had ratified the CoE Convention, thereby rendering the Dublin Agreement redundant.44
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As can be seen, in the early years of regional cooperation, some small-scale, sectoral conventions 
were successful as long as they attended to very clearly described problems such as extradition. But 
even then, allowances had to be made for sovereignty and the formula to square this circle was again 
the ADAI notion: if a state was not willing to extradite a suspect, at least it had to submit them to its 
own courts. This was not an ideal solution, but it was the only one practicable. Even amongst 
similar and like-minded states such as the EC members—and even between France and West 
Germany—cooperation on the prosecution of terrorists was overshadowed by concerns about 
sovereignty and remnants of mutual distrust. This necessitated a backstop, which they found in 
the ADAI principle. However, the case of Trevi shows that some limited success on technical issues 
and cooperation was still possible as long as it did not restrict states’ general freedom of action. 
Gathering and exchanging information and best practices was welcome, but legalising (and thereby 
institutionalising), ultimately political, decisions (such as extradition requests) and taking them out 
of the hands of political decision makers was a step too far for European states in the 1970s.
Another field of cooperation was that of intelligence. In 1969, Western European states set up an 
informal forum for the exchange of information and intelligence on terrorist groups as well as 
experiences in counterterrorism. The Club de Berne consisted of senior officials of national security 
and intelligence agencies and met twice a year. They also established a communication network, 
Kilowatt, in 1971 as an early warning system with intelligence pertaining to Palestinian terrorists. The 
same year, Israel, the US, and other non-EC members also joined the network. The Club de Berne is 
still in existence today and this long and successful level of cooperation can be explained by the secrecy 
around this mode of assistance. Yet, again, the technical nature of cooperation also helped, as meetings 
were held on the officials—and not political—level. Consequently, trust could be built over time and 
personal connections, which are essential in any form of intelligence cooperation, could be forged and 
maintained. The non-involvement of politicians also allowed the Club de Berne to remain somewhat 
“above politics,” focussing instead on the day-to-day business of counterterrorism.45
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was another entity concerned with 
terrorism, but it only dealt with terrorism in the margins. Its prime objective was to maintain intra- 
state peace, and foster cooperation across the Iron Curtain. Still, Article VI of the Helsinki Final Act of 
1975 postulated that the participating states “will, inter alia, refrain from direct or indirect assistance to 
terrorist activities.” This set a basis for terrorism to be a future agenda item for the CSCE. Further 
plans to involve the organisation in antiterrorism efforts were a consequence of the hijacking of the 
Lufthansa jet Landshut in October 1977 and the fact that Western governments were—rightly— 
concerned that terrorists might retreat to the Socialist countries to hide.46 West Germany in particular 
tried to involve Eastern Europeans in antiterrorism cooperation and, at the CSCE follow up con-
ference in Belgrade in 1977–78, Bonn wanted the final communiqué to also include a paragraph on 
terrorism. CSCE members were supposed to grant each other assistance in hijacking crises, and to 
support a (West German) anti-hostage-taking initiative at the UN.47 Nevertheless, subsequent nego-
tiations about the paragraph were more difficult than anticipated and the Western Europeans’ 
antiterrorism fatigue noticed elsewhere also extended to the CSCE. Eastern Europeans were equally 
reluctant to discuss terrorism as they did not deem the CSCE to be the right forum for this issue and 
stressed their conviction that the UN would be a more suitable organisation for it.48 Consequently, in 
the concluding document of the Belgrade meeting, the terrorism clause did not appear. The text only 
stated that “[c]onsensus was not reached on a number of proposals submitted to the meeting.”49 In 
light of the different nature of the matters addressed by the CSCE—human rights and peace in Europe, 
which were the cornerstones of the détente process—terrorism was not allowed to further burden the 
already busy agenda.50 At least in the 1970s, terrorism remained very much a side show for the CSCE.
In addition to European and American countries, Asian states also attempted closer cooperation in 
fighting terrorism. In the late 1970s, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka began discussing the creation of a regional organisation to foster integration and promote 
regional cooperation. In December 1985, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) was founded as an intergovernmental entity dedicated to “promot[ing] active collaboration 
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and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields”51 but members 
did not extend its scope to political or security matters.52 However, due to the proliferation of 
terrorism in the region, especially in Sri Lanka, the SAARC could not ignore this topic either.53
During the Kathmandu summit of 1987, terrorism was added to the agenda and the states agreed to 
cooperate. They adopted the Regional Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and also reiterated 
their commitment to fighting terrorism in the Kathmandu Summit Declaration. The basic notion 
behind the convention was similar to the European and OAS treaties: it wanted to reign in the POE so 
that it would not apply to certain “terroristic” acts. To that end, Article 1 provided a positive list and 
defined the crimes to which the convention would apply. Article IV makes mention of another familiar 
concept, ADAI: If a state “does not extradite that person, [it should] submit the case without exception 
and without delay, to its competent authorities [which] shall take their decisions in the same manner 
as in the case of any offence of a serious nature under the law of the State.” This clause shows the global 
reach the ADAI formula had achieved by the late 1980s, as it was now present in all regional 
antiterrorism agreements.
Mirroring developments elsewhere, the duty to extradite was, however, limited by several qualifica-
tions in the treaty. Most importantly, Article VII ruled that “Contracting States shall not be obliged to 
extradite, if it appears to the requested State that by reason of the trivial nature of the case or by reason 
of the request for the surrender or return of a fugitive offender not being made in good faith or in the 
interests of justice or for any other reason it is unjust or inexpedient to surrender or return the fugitive 
offender.” Yet, the state was still obliged to try the person. Therefore, in theory, the convention ensured 
that a terrorist would face a judge either where they were apprehended or in the country to which they 
were extradited. The Kathmandu Declaration gave further impetus to the antiterrorism moment, by 
expressing the states’ “unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and practice of terrorism as 
criminal and expressed their abhorrence of their impact on life and property, socio-economic devel-
opment, political stability, regional peace and cooperation.”54 The convention entered into effect in 
1988 after all members had ratified it. It was another show of regional unity on the issue of terrorism.
Unfortunately, consecutive summits in the 1990s and 2000s lamented the lack of progress in the 
harmonisation of terrorism laws (and definitions) amongst the member states.55 While the legal texts 
were agreed upon, actual implementation and cooperation did not follow. The Colombo summit in 
1990 also established the Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk, which was to implement the conven-
tion, but it had few results.56 In spite of the ambitious goals of suppressing terrorism, due to regional 
rivalries—most importantly between India and Pakistan—“[t]he actual state of cross-border coopera-
tion against terrorism and crime within the SAARC region [. . .] is a far-cry from the declared 
policy.”57 Despite the lip service paid to multilateral assistance, if any cooperation occurred at all, it 
was bilateral in nature.58
These examples show that regional organisations were involved in the global legal battle against 
terrorism. These efforts also demonstrate that states were aware of the pitfalls of regional cooperation, 
most importantly in the form of the POE, and attempted to overcome them. Yet despite high 
ambitions, the nitty-gritty of these negotiations proved tricky, and many existing gaps could not be 
completely filled. While all of the above-mentioned conventions restricted the likelihood that terrorists 
could walk away freely from a crime, they nevertheless left some wiggle room for states when it came to 
extradition. The important development here was that even if extraditions were rejected, the states still 
had to try suspects and ensure these serious crimes would attract severe penalties. Whether states 
would actually abide by their legal obligations was another matter entirely. On a more positive note, 
this section shows that technical, practical cooperation was more constructive as Trevi or the Club de 
Berne demonstrate. While they, too, left room for improvement, they proved that on less politicised 
levels of direct cooperation between agencies, results could be achieved.
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Global organisations
The global organisation, the UN, sprang into action on terrorism as well. As with the other efforts 
discussed here, the balance sheet of its activities is mixed. The UN did produce some results (the 
Diplomats Convention (1973) and Hostages Convention (1979), which will be detailed shortly), 
but it never achieved its ultimate goal of successfully adopting a Comprehensive Convention 
Against Terrorism. At the beginning, though, the negotiations for the latter convention were 
promising. In the aftermath of the Black September attack on the Israeli athletes at the Munich 
Olympics in 1972, the time seemed ripe for the UN to attend to terrorism in general, not just 
hijackings. UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim called for the organisation to take action and so 
did U.S. President Richard Nixon. Agenda items were submitted to the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) by both and were soon merged into one, but the presumed unity soon vanished. As the 
motivation for these efforts derived from the Palestinian attack, the discussions were quickly 
dragged not only into the Israel-Palestine conflict but also into the wider debates on decolonisa-
tion, and the instruments that national liberation movements (NLM) had at their disposal 
to legitimately rid themselves of foreign occupation.59 As many newly independent countries in 
the Third World, most prominently Algeria,60 had emerged from a struggle that involved the use of 
terrorism, they were reluctant to delegitimise it. The debates on the Comprehensive Convention 
dragged on for years and no results were achieved by the end of the 1970s. The Ad Hoc Committee 
on Terrorism that was established to forge a coherent and comprehensive approach to countering 
terrorism was in a gridlock by 1979.61 There were a number of UNGA resolutions that emerged as 
a result of compromises reached within the Committee (e.g., UNGA Resolution 36/109 or 
Resolution 38/130) as it gradually came to terms with condemning terrorism; but a definition of 
terrorism remained absent. The matter of a Comprehensive Convention was thus put to rest until 
the UNGA undertook explicit efforts in Resolution 54/110 in 1999. In light of the absence of any 
consensus on a definition of terrorism and the consequently low likelihood of agreeing on 
a Comprehensive Convention, over the years, focus shifted towards a step-by-step criminalisation 
of specific terrorism-related offences. This approach would allow the UN to circumvent the 
complexities regarding definitions and would avoid, or at the very least mitigate, broader debates 
on the legitimacy of the use of violence in certain circumstances.62
In the 1970s, crime-specific UN efforts were more successful, mostly because they followed 
a piecemeal approach and concentrated on specific aspects of terrorism rather than the problem in 
its entirety. The Diplomats Convention of 1973 was negotiated in a very short time and was a response 
to the aforementioned proliferation of attacks against diplomats, mostly in Latin and South America.63 
Its underpinning motivation was to ensure that states could go about their diplomatic business 
undisturbed and to protect their diplomatic agents—prime targets of terrorism because of their 
symbolism as representatives of a state—as much as possible. The convention stipulated that the 
murder or kidnapping of internationally protected persons (diplomats) and attacks against diplomatic 
premises were not acceptable and that offenders should not escape with impunity. Thus, negotiating 
parties invoked the ADAI principle to violence against diplomats, closing the loophole for terrorists to 
escape justice. There was an unusual show of unity at the UN on this topic, although it was not entirely 
surprising, as most states agreed that diplomats should be protected (possibly also because those 
negotiating the convention were diplomats as well, and their heads of governments and ministers 
would enjoy diplomatic status while being abroad too). Furthermore, there was an interest in this topic 
that crossed blocs as countries from all around the globe were affected by assaults on their diplomats as 
has been shown above. In essence, UN members drew a line about their quarrels on terrorism, when 
the latter was threatening to affect intra-state affairs; diplomacy was too delicate a business to be 
disturbed by terrorists. To confirm this observation, in following years, the UN Security Council, too, 
would deal with terrorism when there was a perception that it would endanger peace or international 
relations.64 In general though, until the end of the Cold War, the UNGA played the dominant role in 
devising antiterrorism measures while the Security Council only concerned itself with specific crises 
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(such as Entebbe in 1976, or when a veto power was concerned as with the Libya-sponsored attacks on 
U.S. citizens in the mid- and late 1980s). After the Cold War, this would change and the Security 
Council would play a much more prominent part in the UN response to terrorism.65
Once the Diplomats Convention was adopted in 1973, the UN soon turned to another convention 
project. Fuelled by a growing number of terrorist hostage crises, the West German government 
proposed a new agreement that would cover hostage situations not involving diplomats but ordinary 
people. The Germans were optimistic that the Diplomats Convention was a positive milestone and 
with terrorism increasingly turning against non-Western countries as well, Bonn hoped that progress 
might be possible on their project as well. Yet, the speedy success of the Diplomats Convention could 
not be replicated, and it took the UNGA, its Sixth (Legal) Committee and various working groups 
almost until the end of the decade to agree on and adopt the Hostages Convention.66 The bones of 
contention, much like in the debates on a Comprehensive Convention, centred around the notion of 
allowing certain acts of terrorism when committed by NLM. The absence of any other means of 
resistance available to NLM was deemed serious enough by some states to make allowances for this. 
This would also mean that citizens of certain states would be considered “innocent” and others, such as 
Israelis, “guilty” victims, against which hostage operations could be conducted. Western states pushed 
back hard on this notion and no breakthrough seemed possible for a while. Ultimately, small 
negotiation groups managed to agree on compromises that were acceptable to the majority of 
UNGA members. They, again, followed a problem-centred (or sectoral) approach, which disconnected 
the manifestations of terrorism (hostage-taking) from its political context (e.g., self-determination). 
The notion of “guilty victims” was dismissed completely and the issue of national liberation was 
circumvented by underscoring that the convention applied to acts of hostage-taking in peacetime only 
and that crises occurring within the context of armed conflicts would be covered by International 
Humanitarian Law including the recently adopted 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions. With these obstacles removed, the Hostages Convention was finally adopted.67
Like others before it, the convention is built around the sectoral approach and the ADAI principle. 
To safeguard national sovereignty, states were not under an absolute obligation to extradite culprits 
but could, instead, try them in their own courts. The notion behind this was a familiar one by now: that 
no hostage-taker was to escape justice and that safe havens, encouraging terrorists to commit hostage 
crises in the future, would be abolished. The punitive and thus preventative nature of the convention is 
the same as with previous antiterrorism efforts within IOs. The 1970s thus ended on a positive note for 
the UN. Two conventions were adopted, but the ultimate goal of the Comprehensive Convention was 
as elusive as ever; and still remains so today.
In the meantime, the UNGA continued its practice of adopting resolutions. While these are 
recommendations only, and consequently one might argue that they hold limited weight, they are 
still an indication of a global opinion on international issues. In 1985, the UNGA adopted Resolution 
40/61 and in doing so, for the first time, “[u]nequivocally condemn[ed], as criminal, all acts, methods 
and practises of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed, including those which jeopardise 
friendly relations among States and their security.”68 Member states, however, remained reluctant to 
close all loopholes for NLM and continued to emphasise the right of people to seek self- 
determination,69 as some countries (e.g., Namibia) continued to struggle for independence. Yet, 
continuing instances of terrorism (e.g., the April 1983 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Lebanon, the 
October 1983 bombing of Marine barracks in Beirut, and the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in 1985), 
made it more and more difficult for countries to legitimize the use of terrorism. This acknowl-
edgement is also evidenced in the change of title of the UNGA agenda item away from “Measures 
to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes 
fundamental freedoms and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of 
violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to 
sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes” to simply “measures 
to eliminate international terrorism.” This alteration underscored the growing conviction within the 
UNGA that terrorism should not be allowed, no matter what its causes.70
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Another global entity—in terms of scope and membership—also addressed terrorism: The G7. It 
was founded in 1975 to coordinate the economic policies between major economic powers in the 
aftermath of several severe crises—the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and the oil crises of 
1973/74. In 1978, the heads of governments of the seven most economically advanced Western 
countries71 met in Bonn for their fourth G7 meeting. The purpose was mostly to discuss macro-
economic issues, but political questions quickly crept into the talks as well. The host of the G7 summit, 
West Germany, had recently gone through a dreadful hijacking crisis—the abduction of the Lufthansa 
Landshut plane—during the “German Autumn” of 1977. With the memory of this crisis still fresh on 
everyone’s mind, the G7 members were keen to make a show of unity with their Bonn summit in 
June 1978, and to condemn terrorism, and especially hijackings. To do this, the old plans for an 
implementation mechanism for the ICAO conventions were undusted.72 The G7 members issued 
a Bonn Declaration that threatened those in negligence of their obligations under the ICAO conven-
tions with an airline boycott.73 Seeing how the G7 members’ airlines accounted for roughly two thirds 
of international air traffic at the time, this was a serious threat as the targets of these sanctions would— 
de facto—be shut off from global travel. The underlying motivation was that if the ICAO conventions 
got some teeth, states would be more willing to abide by them and try or extradite hijackers.74 This, it 
was hoped, in turn would dissuade terrorists from abducting planes to begin with—a manifestation of 
the preventative notion underpinning all antiterrorism efforts at the time.
Yet while the message was clear, cracks soon appeared in the united G7 front. In follow-up 
meetings the states could not agree on a mechanism for implementing it and the longer the negotia-
tions lasted, the more doubts were voiced. France, for instance, was particularly concerned about the 
implications this declaration would have on its airline industry and on bilateral agreements and other 
members agreed. The issue was discreetly moved to the backburner and while the declaration was 
reiterated at subsequent G7 summits, no formal process and mechanism was ever developed. 
However, the declaration was evoked twice: against Afghanistan in 1981 and against South Africa in 
1981/82.75 In sum, the G7 had only nominal success in dealing with terrorism in the 1970s, and the old 
U.S. plan for a proper implementation mechanism was, once again, relegated to the margins.
Conclusion
The attempts by IOs to tackle terrorism were never without their challenges—or indeed, challengers. 
IOs were often criticised for inactivity, the watering down of solutions, the lengthiness of decision- 
making processes, and the often-exasperating balancing act between national interests and common 
efforts. Many of these problems also extended to the international campaign against terrorism. Yet, 
from the 1960s onwards, progressively more organisations contributed to this campaign. What started 
off in the 1960s at the ICAO, spread to other regional organisations, such as the OAS, the CoE, the EC, 
and to the SAARC in Asia. Global organisations such as the UN or the G7 contributed to these 
endeavours as well with varying success.
One first, general observation is that piecemeal is not a dirty word. This article shows that narrowly 
defined antiterrorism projects within specialised or regional organisations tended to fare better than 
ambitious all-encompassing projects. These clearly defined projects, though often criticised for not 
going far enough, have built a remarkable international antiterrorism regime. In that sense, specialised 
and regional organisations might be preferable fora for negotiating antiterrorism efforts, rather than 
striving for very general and comprehensive conventions. The international antiterrorism regime by 
the end of the 1980s consisted of several treaties addressing specific aspects of terrorism—such as 
hostage taking, hijackings or attacks on oil platforms. Anything that went beyond that limited scope— 
such as the UN Comprehensive Convention—was doomed to fail.76 This also meant that the term 
“terrorism” was hardly ever defined at all, and if it was, it was a very loose definition to fit a broad array 
of cases. This was a deliberate and very pragmatic approach: by focussing on the actions to be 
outlawed, rather than the blurry notion of “terrorism” itself, the negotiators tried to avoid political 
stalemates. As terrorism was—and still is—a contested concept, focussing in matter-of-fact fashion on 
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specific manifestations of terrorism, such as hijackings or hostage-takings, allowed for some tangible 
compromises to be reached among states; rather than just paying lip service to the fight against 
terrorism. It made it possible for states to deal with terrorism without even explicitly mentioning or 
defining it. The piecemeal or sectoral approach was the key to the successful adoption of such 
agreements.
Secondly, the ADAI principle evolved into the gold standard to avoid conventions or their negotia-
tions being sucked into the maelstrom of unresolvable (geo)political quarrels. Leaving some leeway to 
states as to whether they want to extradite a suspect or not, made it possible to uphold the notion of 
sovereignty. At the same time though, at least in theory (and law), it would ensure prosecution of those 
suspects, either through extradition (aut dedere) or immediate trials (aut iudicare).
Thirdly, an important development that has become evident is that states always defend and protect 
their national sovereignty, even when faced with the somewhat global threat of terrorism. Thus, in the 
increasingly more globalised 1970s and 1980s, the ancient notion of sovereignty remained largely 
intact. This reluctance of states to having their hands tied by international conventions is reflected well 
in the unsuccessful initiatives to reach agreement on more comprehensive antiterrorism conventions. 
It is for this reason, that the sectoral approach combined with the ADAI principle worked better at 
achieving results: it restricted cases where states were bound by any sort of automatism to a very select 
number of scenarios and even then, states had a choice—and the final say—on how to proceed.
This leads to the fourth observation: international antiterrorism efforts in the last two decades of 
the Cold War were punitive in design—compelling states to try terrorists—but their ultimate objective 
was preventative in nature. By closing safe havens and ensuring that terrorists—whether they were 
hijackers, hostage-takers, or assassins—would not escape justice, so it was hoped, further acts of 
terrorism could be discouraged and prevented. This, of course, only works when someone wants to 
survive the act and is afraid of spending the rest of their lives in a prison cell. With the advent of suicide 
terrorism, from the 1990s onwards, this logic no longer applied, and new solutions had to be found. 
One of them was a shift from a punitive/preventative approach to a pre-emptive one. Rather than 
punishing terrorists for committing an act, the post-Cold War conventions—not covered in this article 
for space reasons—aimed to remove the means from terrorists to even carry out their attacks. This 
trend is quite obvious, for instance, in the Convention on the Financing of Terrorism (1999) but its 
roots can be traced back to the 1980s: The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
of 1979 puts a major emphasis not only on ensuring that perpetrators will face justice (relying again on 
ADAI in Article 10), but in fact, it focusses on means to ensure that terrorists will never get their hands 
on the material to begin with (since the first articles of the convention are purely dedicated to 
safeguarding mechanisms for nuclear material). As this article has demonstrated, however, the root 
notion to increase security around vulnerable infrastructure and to prevent any acts of violence in the 
first place goes all the way back to the 1960s ICAO conventions and efforts to strengthen airport and 
airplane security. This shows that current antiterrorism efforts have their origins in the 1960s and 
1970s. History matters.
Many of the fundamental problems that states and IOs face today when designing antiterrorism 
efforts are still the same as in the past: mistrust between states, concerns about sovereignty, as well as 
diverging definitions of terrorism and different interests around it. This article thus hopes to make 
a contribution to practical efforts and academic scholarship today by outlining how these obstacles 
were addressed in the first decades of international antiterrorism efforts: with the sectoral (or 
piecemeal) approach, the principle of “extradite or try,” and the punitive/preventative leitmotif, 
which were the key developments of the first stage of IOs antiterrorism efforts up until 1990. With 
the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical context changed dramatically, and this affected how IOs 
operated. Likewise, the rise of Islamist—and suicide—terrorism altered the terrorist challenge. For 
these reasons, this article stops at 1990. But more extensive studies of consecutive efforts, just as much 
as of non-governmental actors and their influence on international antiterrorism efforts are worth-
while avenues for future research.
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As with most things, there were (and are) no perfect answers for how to deal with terrorism. While 
more often than not IOs managed to agree on some sort of efforts, these almost always contained certain 
loopholes (and “reservations”). This is not an observation exclusive to international antiterrorism efforts 
but it is rooted in the very nature of negotiating highly sensitive policies amongst a variety of actors who 
are committed to jealously protecting their sovereignty and balancing national interests with geopolitical 
realities. This meant that in many cases the outcome (conventions, agreements, or protocols) was not as 
rigid as some negotiators, observers—or in fact victims of terrorism—would have liked them to be. 
Whether that is a major flaw of these agreements is a matter of opinion: certainly, one can question the 
amount of time and effort invested in negotiations that nevertheless do not completely remove the 
problems they addressed.
Yet one can counter that by focussing not only on the outcome but also on the process of 
negotiations. IOs had an important role to play as fora for conversation, and exchanging information. 
In IO negotiations, states could learn to understand other states better and to thereby pave the way for 
more effective instruments in the future. IOs were, hence, important fora for addressing a topic as 
politically charged as terrorism. They helped to develop better mutual understanding and fewer 
misunderstandings and thereby made it possible for states’ perceptions on terrorism to converge. 
This, precisely, allowed the general notion of the impermissibility of terrorism to emerge in the late 
1970s and throughout the 1980s. Moreover, IOs developed an increasingly extensive web of legal 
agreements delimiting—if not defining—“terrorism.” Thus, IOs had—and still have—an important 
part to play in establishing an international regime that takes away moral sway from the terrorists and 
their “noble” intentions and further limits the exceptions that allow the offenders to walk away 
unpunished. This also makes it ever harder for states to shelter terrorists or commission acts of 
terrorism themselves. This process does not produce quick results, but it might still be effective in the 
long run. As an example from the past, when Eastern European states provided shelter to wanted 
Western terrorists during the Cold War, they would do so with absolute discretion and would go 
through extensive efforts—including plastic surgery for the terrorists—to prevent the discovery of their 
harbouring of terrorists.77 The ever-increasing consensus that terrorism was impermissible made it 
politically and morally unacceptable to—at least—openly host terrorists. IOs contributed to making this 
behaviour deplorable.
As discussed above, this article does not aim to assess the effectiveness of the efforts negotiated nor 
does it offer comprehensive discussions of their successes. The problem with researching antiterrorism 
is that we will hardly ever know which acts did not take place. When did the threat of prosecution deter 
potential terrorists? When did intra-state collaboration work at preventing acts of terrorism from even 
being conceived? Indeed, antiterrorism failures are blatantly public, while the successes are often kept 
secret in the name of national security. This makes it almost impossible to cast judgment on the 
ultimate effectiveness of the antiterrorism agreement discussed here. Yet politically and diplomatically 
they were successes because states agreed on certain efforts, which were adopted and entered into force 
so that a legal and global anti-terrorist environment could emerge.
The limited space available here did not allow this article to explore many other important issues around 
these agreements: the obligations they enshrined, the compromises they provoked, and the disputes they 
nurtured. Nor could it extensively address the impact of geopolitics or civil society and examine IO 
antiterrorism efforts after the Cold War. One important point to make here, however, is that the 
compromises that many of these agreements codified—welcome as they were—all too often came at the 
expense of other important international goods, not least of which were human rights. In fact, and 
perversely, the deliberate vagueness that was essential to getting states to acquiesce in agreements also 
offered them the opportunity to exploit them under the antiterrorism banner at the expense of other rights. 
Brutal regimes, for instance in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, were all too eager to disguise their 
own state terror as counterterrorism. The conflict between human, civil, and political rights on the one side, 
and antiterrorism efforts on the other, was acute during the Cold War; and it is still ongoing today.
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